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Abstract
With the advent of e-commerce and online banking it has become extremely important that the websites of
the financial institutes (especially, banks) implement up-to-date measures of cyber security (in accordance with
the recommendations of the regulatory authority) and thus circumvent the possibilities of financial frauds that
may occur due to vulnerabilities of the website. Here, we systematically investigate whether Indian banks are
following the above requirement. To perform the investigation, recommendations of Reserve Bank of India (RBI),
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), European Union Agency for Network and Information
Security (ENISA) and Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) are considered as the benchmarks. Further, the
validity and quality of the security certificates of various Indian banks have been tested with the help of a set
of tools (e.g., SSL Certificate Checker provided by Digicert and SSL server test provided by SSL Labs). The
analysis performed by using these tools and a comparison with the benchmarks, have revealed that the security
measures taken by a set of Indian banks are not up-to-date and are vulnerable under some known attacks.
1 Introduction
Indian economy is one of the largest and fastest growing economy of the world, and with the recent initiatives of the
government, it is moving towards complete digitization. In a digital economy, secrecy of the exchanged information
would play a crucial role. In India, several steps have been taken by the banks and government agencies for the
orientation of the end users and thus to reduce the risk of simple frauds that originate due to the mistakes of
the users. However, there is another facet of the security of e-commerce, which involves the service providers and
requires that the banks provide highest possible security without becoming slow. To ensure that the Reserve Bank
of India (RBI), which regulates Indian banks have issued several circulars [1, 2], and have advised Indian banks
to use up-to-date encryption techniques [1–3]. Here, we aim to check, to what extend the Indian banks follow
the advices issued by the RBI and in what cases the security measures taken by the banks are vulnerable. We
would also suggest some solutions for the safe operations of the e-banking portals in the present and future. This
investigation would remain focused on the Indian banks, and would aim to reveal such cases where the security
measures taken by the Indian banks are not up-to-date and are vulnerable under some known attacks. To reveal
these vulnerabilities, we will adopt a more technical approach compared to the earlier studies on the security of
Indian banks and customer perspectives about that [4–6]. Specifically, the validity and quality of the security
certificates of various Indian banks will be tested here with the help of a set of tools (e.g., SSL Certificate Checker
provided by Digicert and SSL server test provided by SSL Labs). The analysis performed by using these tools and
a comparison with the benchmarks, have revealed that the encryption techniques used by many Indian banks are
vulnerable. The uniqueness of the present study is that to the best of our knowledge, no such technical analysis of
the encryption mechanism adopted by the Indian banks has been done until now.
We have already mentioned that the security and privacy issues of Indian banks have been studied earlier [4–6],
but a less technical view was adopted. Specifically, in Ref [4], possible attacks on customers’ information like
phishing, spoofing, vishing had been mentioned. Some efforts had also been made to discuss card-related frauds,
merchant-related frauds, but no efforts had been made to investigate the vulnerability of the banks. In another
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study in the similar line (but not restricted to Indian banks) [7], various dimensions of e-service security had been
listed and utilized to obtain a hierarchical structure of them to compute the weights of security dimensions. Once
again, the analysis was more focused on the perspectives of the end users and led a trivial conclusion that “users will
intend to use e-service if they feel that the quality of e-service is high”. The same conclusion regarding the behavior
of end users has recently been reported again by Taherdoost in [8] through E-Service Technology Acceptance Model
(ETAM) which can evaluate the user acceptance of e-service technology even before the introduction of the service.
Such studies on the acceptability of an e-service by the end users is not new. In a set of earlier studies [9–19], similar
investigations have been made. However, the important question: Which technical (cryptographic) measures taken
by the bank can improve the security of e-service and thus lead to enhanced confidence among the end users had
not been discussed in the earlier works. The present work aims to go beyond technology acceptance model and to
address this issue by highlighting the limitations of the security measures taken by different banks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we perform the vulnerability analysis of Indian
banks and establish that the encryption used by Indian banks are often vulnerable. In Section 3, we compare the
encryption techniques adopted by the Indian banks with the international standards and analyze them in view of the
recommendations of RBI. The comparison, has revealed that many banks are not strictly following RBI guidelines
and thus prone to cyber attacks. Subsequently, in Section 4, we suggest a set of measures that can be adopted
by Indian banks to avoid the use of vulnerable encryption techniques in future. Finally, the paper is concluded in
Section 5.
2 Vulnerability analysis
The SSL client certificates are obtained by the banks from different certifying agencies (CA) like, Symantec Cor-
poration, DigiCert Inc., and Corporation Service Company. These organizations are allowed to issue SSL client
certificate. The online banking websites contain details of the certificates obtained by the banks and the validity of
the certificate. It also provides certified information about the encryption and authentication method used by the
bank to encrypt information before being transmitted over the internet. The quality of these encryption methods can
be analyzed to some extent by looking at the string like, “TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
256 bit keys, TLS 1.2”, which are obtained directly from the security certificate information of the banking website.
A full list of strings describing the encryption and the authentication methods adopted by different banks are pro-
vided in Table A.I of Appendix A. Further, information about the quality of the encryption technique adopted and
their potential vulnerability can be obtained by performing various tests on SSL servers and/or SSL certificates.
Some of the online SSL certificate checking tools that may be used to reveal the potential vulnerability of the
adopted encryption technique are available at [20–23]. In what follows, we report and analyze the results of SSL
server tests performed by SSL Labs [20]. These tests not only reveal the potential vulnerability it also grades the
servers according to their strength. A server graded as A+ seems to be most strong, whereas a server graded as F is
considered to be the weakest or most vulnerable. We have analyzed the security of 38 banks using [20]. The result
is summarized in Fig. 1 (a)-(b), where 1 (a) provides the number distribution of grades obtained by different Public
(Government controlled) banks and 1 (b) provides the same information for the private banks. Fig. 1 (a)-(b),
shows that 13 of the 38 banks obtained A, A+, and A- grades, and they may be viewed to provide relatively higher
security. Similarly, the analysis has shown that B and C grades have been obtained by 8 and 9 banks respectively.
Thus, we may conclude that these banks provide moderate security. Finally, remaining 8 banks are found to obtain
F grade, and they are highly vulnerable, implying the fact that the security measure taken by them is very weak.
There are many reasons that lead to the security weaknesses of this banks. Such weaknesses are characterized by
performing various vulnerability tests and summarized in Tables 1-3. Details of the insecure SSL ciphers supported
by the server of the banks and other drawbacks of these banks are summarized in these tables. Specifically, Table
1 is focused on the analysis of security of those banks that are reasonably secure (obtains A,A+ or, A− grades).
Table 2 and Table 3 summarizes the security analysis performed for the banks with moderate security (Grades B
and C) and those with weak security measures (Grade F), respectively. In a similar line, security analysis performed
for popular wallets provided by non-Banking organizations are reported in Table 4. While analyzing the limitations
of the security measures taken by a bank, in addition to the results of analysis performed by [20], we have also
used the outcome of analysis performed by [21], which essentially tests “Heartbleed vulnerability”, checks whether
the server supports backdated protocols like TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, SSL 3.0, etc., looks for known vulnerable Debian
keys and lists all the SSL ciphers supported by the server. This list is subsequently used to detect whether the
server supports insecure ciphers. The outputs of analysis performed using [20,21] are combined in Tables 1-4. Here
it may be noted that in Table 4, we review the security provided by the most popular non-bank wallets used for
e-commerce by Indians. The analysis performed through [20, 21] has revealed that various banks use vulnerable
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ciphers, specially some of them are found to use keys of inadequate length, support RC4 cipher with older pro-
tocols, support TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, SSL 3.0, etc., and to be vulnerable to Padding Oracle On Downgraded Legacy
Encryption (POODLE) attack (Allahabad Bank, Canara Bank, Indusind Bank and Punjab National Bank) and to
man-in-the-middle attack (MITM) (Bank of Baroda, Syndicate Bank, Indusind Bank). Here, it may be apt to note
that POODLE is a particular type of MITM attack that exploits internet and security software clients’ fallback to
SSL 3.0. These observations are illustrated through Fig. 1 (c), and summarized in Table A.II of Appendix A.
S.No Name of the
bank
(Pub/Pvt)
Website Server (Grade) Remarks
1 State Bank
of India
(Pub)
retail.onlinesbi.com 223.31.160.67 (A+)
2405:a700:14:12c:0:0:0:148
(A+)
(i) HTTP Strict Transport
Security (HSTS) with long
duration deployed on this server.
2 Axis Bank
(Pvt)
retail.axisbank.co.in 121.243.50.21 (A)
2403:0:500:11:0:0:0:160
(A)
3 Andhra
Bank (Pub)
www.online
andhrabank.net.in
103.196.117.1 (A)
4 Catholic
Syrian
Bank (Pvt)
www.csbnet.co.in 115.112.233.198 (A)
5 HDFC
Bank
(Pvt)
netbanking.hdfcbank.com 175.100.160.21 (A) (i) Intermediate certificate has
an insecure signature.
(ii) HTTP Strict Transport
Security (HSTS) with long
duration deployed on this server.
6 Indian
Bank (Pub)
www.indianbank.net.in 115.110.173.99 (A-) (i) Intermediate certificate has
an insecure signature.
7 Oriental
Bank of
Commerce
(Pub)
www.obconline.co.in 220.226.206.37 (A-) (i) Forward Secrecy with the
reference browsers is not
supported.
(ii) HTTP Strict Transport
Security (HSTS) with long
duration deployed on this server.
8 UCO Bank
(Pub)
www.ucoebanking.com 203.200.206.227 (A-)
2405:a080:0:0:0:0:0:30
(A-)
(i) Secure renegotiation is not
supported.
(ii) Forward Secrecy with the
reference browsers is not
supported.
9 United
Bank of
India (Pub)
ebank.unitedbank
ofindia.com
14.142.120.11 (A-)
10 ICICI Bank
(Pvt)
infinity.icicibank.com 203.189.92.162 (A-)
2001:df0:2fd:1:0:0:0:2
(A-)
(i) Secure renegotiation is not
supported.
(ii) Forward Secrecy with the
reference browsers is not
supported.
11 Karnataka
Bank (Pvt)
moneyclick.karnataka
bank.co.in
210.212.203.235 (A-)
125.16.142.105 (A-)
2404:a800:3001:b:0:0:0:5
(A-)
(i) Forward Secrecy with the
reference browsers is not
supported.
12 RBL Bank
(Pvt)
online.rblbank.com 180.179.110.171 (A-) (i) Secure renegotiation is not
supported.
(ii) Forward Secrecy with the
reference browsers is not
supported.
3
13 Yes Bank
(Pvt)
netbanking.yesbank.co.in 123.136.19.72 (A-) (i) Secure renegotiation is not
supported.
(ii) Forward Secrecy with the
reference browsers is not
supported.
Table 1: List of banks that provide reasonably good security in the
sense that they obtain grades ∈ {A+,A, A−}
S.
No
Name of the
bank
(Pub/Pvt)
Website Server (Grade) Issues that reduced the
grade
1 Vijaya Bank
(Pub)
www.vijayabankonline.in 210.212.204.30 (B)
219.65.65.166 (B)
2403:0:500:31:0:0:0:12
(B)
(i) Accepts RC4 cipher, but
only with older protocols.
(ii) Forward Secrecy with the
reference browsers is not
supported.
2 Bank of
India (Pub)
starconnectcbs.bank
ofindia.com
61.246.202.9 (B) (i) Supports weak
Diffie-Hellman (DH) key
exchange parameters.
(ii) Forward Secrecy with the
reference browsers is not
supported.
3 Indian
Overseas
Bank (Pub)
www.iobnet.co.in 121.242.125.68 (B) (i) Uses SSL 3, which is obsolete
and insecure.
(ii) Accepts RC4 cipher, but
only with older protocols.
(iii) Forward Secrecy with the
reference browsers is not
supported.
4 IDBI Bank
Ltd (Pub)
inet.idbibank.co.in 103.93.45.42 (B)
2001:df1:3700:1:0:0:0:7
(B)
(i) Accepts RC4 cipher, but
only with older protocols.
(ii) Secure renegotiation is not
supported.
(iii) Forward Secrecy with the
reference browsers is not
supported.
5 DCB Bank
(Pvt)
pib.dcbbank.com 202.56.244.126 (B)
203.196.200.194 (B)
(i) Accepts RC4 cipher, but
only with older protocols.
(ii) Forward Secrecy with the
reference browsers is not
supported.
6 Fednet
Internet
Banking
(Pvt)
www.fednetbank.com 121.243.127.68 (B) (i) Accepts RC4 cipher, but
only with older protocols.
(ii) Forward Secrecy with the
reference browsers is not
supported.
7 IDFC Bank
(Pvt)
my.idfcbank.com 103.233.77.139 (B) (i) Supports weak
Diffie-Hellman (DH) key
exchange parameters.
(ii) Forward Secrecy with the
reference browsers is not
supported.
4
8 Lakshmi
Vilas Bank
(Pvt)
www.lvbankonline.in 121.243.113.251 (B) (i) Accepts RC4 cipher, but
only with older protocols.
(ii) Forward Secrecy with the
reference browsers is not
supported.
9 Allahabad
bank (Pub)
www.allahabadbank.in 2401:8800:70:1:0:0:0:2
(C)
180.179.170.68 (C)
(i) Vulnerable to the POODLE
attack.
(ii) Supports older protocols,
but does not support the
current best TLS 1.2.
(iii) Accepts RC4 cipher, but
only with older protocols.
10 Central
Bank of
India (Pub)
www.centralbank.net.in 223.30.146.175 (C)
112.133.218.235 (C)
(i) Vulnerable to the POODLE
attack.
(ii) Accepts RC4 cipher, but
only with older protocols.
(iii) Forward Secrecy with the
reference browsers is not
supported.
11 Dhan Bank
(Pvt)
netbank.dhanbank.in 115.117.58.155 (C)
59.144.54.55 (C)
(i) Uses SSL 3, which is obsolete
and insecure.
(ii) Uses RC4 with modern
protocols.
(iii) Forward Secrecy with the
reference browsers is not
supported.
12 Punjab And
Sind Bank
(Pub)
www.psbonline.co.in 202.191.179.43 (C) (i) Accepts RC4 cipher, but
only with older protocols.
(ii) Uses 64-bit block cipher
(3DES / DES / RC2 / IDEA)
with modern protocols.
(iii) Forward Secrecy with the
reference browsers is not
supported.
13 J & K Bank
(Pvt)
www.jkbankonline.com 223.30.216.170 (C) (i) Supports weak DH key
exchange parameters.
(ii) Uses SSL 3, which is
obsolete and insecure.
(iii) Uses RC4 with modern
protocols.
(iv) Forward Secrecy with the
reference browsers is not
supported.
14 Karur Vysya
Bank (Pvt)
www.kvbnet.co.in 115.249.239.101 (C) (i) Accepts RC4 cipher, but
only with older protocols.
(ii) Uses 64-bit block cipher
(3DES / DES / RC2 / IDEA)
with modern protocols.
(iii) Forward Secrecy with the
reference browsers is not
supported.
5
15 Kotak
Mahindra
Bank (Pvt)
www.kotak.com 203.196.200.28 (C)
2403:0:100:51:0:0:0:51
(C)
(i) Uses RC4 with modern
protocols.
(ii) Uses 64-bit block cipher
(3DES / DES / RC2 / IDEA)
(iii) Forward Secrecy with the
reference browsers is not
supported.
16 South Indian
Bank (Pvt)
sibernet.southindian
bank.com
103.212.29.50 (C) (i) Uses 64-bit block cipher
(3DES / DES / RC2 / IDEA)
with modern protocols.
(ii) Forward Secrecy with the
reference browsers is not
supported.
17 Tamilnad
Mercantile
Bank (Pvt)
www.tmbnet.in 124.124.113.139 (A)
14.141.76.115 (A)
115.254.82.230 (C)
14.142.204.70 (C)
Table 2: List of banks that provide moderate security in the sense
that they obtain grades ∈ {B,C}.
S.
No
Name of the
bank
(Pub/Pvt)
Website Server(s) (Grade) Issues that reduced the
grade
1 Canara
Bank (Pub)
netbanking.canarabank.in 180.92.164.8 (F)
2404:a500:0:1000:0:0:60:e
(F)
(i) Vulnerable to MITM attacks
because it supports insecure
renegotiation.
(ii) Forward Secrecy with the
reference browsers is not
supported.
2 Corporation
Bank (Pub)
www.corpretail.com 202.62.247.23 (F) (i) Supports anonymous
(insecure) suites and other
insecure cipher suites
(ii) Supports weak DH key
exchange parameters.
3 Dena Bank
(Pub)
www.denaiconnect.co.in 103.224.110.30 (F) (i) Supports insecure cipher
suites (see below for details).
(ii) Supports 512-bit export
suites and might be vulnerable
to the FREAK attack.
(iii) Intermediate certificate
contains an insecure signature.
(iv) Supports older protocols,
but does not support the
current best TLS 1.2.
(v) Forward Secrecy with the
reference browsers is not
supported.
(vi) Accepts RC4 cipher, but
only with older protocols.
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4 Punjab
National
Bank (Pub)
netbanking.netpnb.com 103.59.140.7 (F)
223.31.51.214 (F)
(i) Vulnerable to the POODLE
TLS attack.
(ii) Intolerant to newer protocol
versions, which might cause
connection failures.
(iii) Supports older protocols,
but does not support the
current best TLS 1.2.
(iv) Forward Secrecy with the
reference browsers is not
supported.
5 Syndicate
Bank (Pub)
www.syndonline.in 220.226.205.223 (F) (i) Vulnerable to MITM attacks
because it supports insecure
renegotiation.
(ii) Uses SSL 3, which is
obsolete and insecure.
(iii) Uses RC4 with modern
protocols.
(iv) Uses 64-bit block cipher
(3DES / DES / RC2 / IDEA)
with modern protocols.
(v) Forward Secrecy with the
reference browsers is not
supported.
6 Indusind
(Pvt)
indusnet.indusind.com 203.196.200.211 (F) (i) Vulnerable to the POODLE
attack.
(ii) Vulnerable to MITM attacks
because it supports insecure
renegotiation.
(iii) Forward Secrecy with the
reference browsers is not
supported.
7 Bhandhan
Bank (Pvt)
bandhanbankonline.com 103.231.79.57 (F)
2400:3b00:20:4:0:0:0:92
(F)
(i) Vulnerable to the OpenSSL
Padding Oracle vulnerability
(CVE-2016-2107) and thus
insecure.
(ii) HTTP Strict Transport
Security (HSTS) with long
duration deployed on this server.
8 Bank of
Baroda
(Pub)
www.bobibanking.com 14.140.233.71 (F)
2001:e48:22:100a:0:0:0:11
Table 3: List of banks that provide reasonably weak security in the
sense that they have obtained F grades.
S.
No
Name of the
bank
Website Server (Grade) Issues that reduced the
grade
1 Paytm
payments
bank
paytm.com 52.221.159.215 (A+)
52.77.12.221 (A+)
HTTP Strict Transport Security
(HSTS) with long duration
deployed on this server.
2 Airtel
payments
bank
www.airtel.in 23.13.173.139 (B) This server accepts RC4 cipher,
but only with older protocols.
Grade capped to B.
7
3 Freecharge www.freecharge.in 2600:1408:10:1a8:0:0:0:1c64 (A)
23.49.179.215 (A)
2600:1408:10:1ae:0:0:0:1c64 (A)
4 Mobikwik www.mobikwik.com 180.179.23.136 (A)
2401:8800:c11:3:0:0:0:4 (A)
Table 4: Security analysis of the wallets that are popularly used in
India.
3 Comparison of the encryption techniques used with the benchmark
adopted internationally and advised by the regulatory authority
In Point 6 of RBI circular [1], it is categorically mentioned in the context of arrangement for continuous surveillance,
that “Testing for vulnerabilities at reasonable intervals of time is very important. The nature of cyber-attacks are
such that they can occur at any time and in a manner that may not have been anticipated. Hence, it is mandated
that a SOC (Security Operations Centre) be set up at the earliest, if not yet been done. It is also essential that
this Centre ensures continuous surveillance and keeps itself regularly updated on the latest nature of emerging
cyber threats”. The analysis performed above clearly indicates that most of the Indian banks are not following
this recommendation of RBI as they are still using vulnerable and backdated ciphers. Further, in the same context
(i.e., in the context of vulnerability), in Ref. [2] Page 31, Section 16, RBI has clearly emphasized on the necessity
of regular vulnerability tests by stating the following, “... Banks that do not scan for vulnerabilities and address
discovered flaws proactively face a significant likelihood of having their computer systems compromised. ii. The
following are some of the measures suggested:
“a. Automated vulnerability scanning tools need to be used against all systems on their networks on a periodic
basis, say monthly or weekly or more frequently.
“b. Banks should ensure that vulnerability scanning is performed in an authenticated mode (i.e., configuring
the scanner with administrator credentials) at least quarterly, ...”.
It’s clear that many banks are not strictly following this advise of RBI. In Ref. [2] Page 29, Section 14, point (v),
in the context of encryption, RBI has advised banks as follows, “Normally, a minimum of 128-bit SSL encryption
is expected. Constant advances in computer hardware, cryptanalysis and distributed brute force techniques may
induce use of larger key lengths periodically. It is expected that banks will properly evaluate security requirements
associated with their internet banking systems and other relevant systems and adopt an encryption solution that
is commensurate with the degree of confidentiality and integrity required. Banks should only select encryption
algorithms which are well established international standards and which have been subjected to rigorous scrutiny
by an international cryptographer community....”. Now although RBI is recommending a minimum of 128-bit
SSL encryption, it is found that Kayur Vashiya Bank, Dena Bank4, Kotak Mahinrda, The South Indian Bank,
Punjab and Sind bank, etc., are still providing 112 bit encryption which is bellow the recommended norm. If we
further concentrate on the last part of the RBI advise that recommends the use of “encryption algorithms which
are well established international standards and which have been subjected to rigorous scrutiny by an international
cryptographer community”, we would easily realize that Bank should now follow at least 256-bit encryption to be
consistent with the international standards (i.e., recommendations of NIST, ENISA and IETF5 [24–26]) and stop
supporting SHA, SHA-1, SHA-224, TLS 1.0. TLS 1.1 and other vulnerable ciphers mentioned above. In fact banks
should now start using TLS 1.3 as it is faster than TLS 1.2 and it has many advantages over TLS 1.2. Further,
recently IETF has approved TLS 1.3 as the next version of TLS protocols [27].
4 Measures suggested to circumvent the vulnerability of encryption
techniques in future
Banks should immediately stop supporting vulnerable ciphers. In the next phase, they should implement post-
quantum crytographic protocols [28] like, lattice-based, multivariate, code-based, hash-based cryptography, and
4Recently stopped using 112 bit encryption
5IETF is the body that is authorized to approve internet standards and protocols. The recommendation of IETF for the algorithms
to be used for practical application are valid only for a period of six months, and consequently, it’s important to update the security
measures taken by a bank at least once in every six months.
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Figure 1: (a) Number distribution of grades obtained by different public banks, (b) Number distribution of grades
obtained by different private banks, (c) Number distribution of the Public banks showing a particular characteristic
of vulnerability (weakness), (c) Number distribution of the Private banks showing a particular characteristic of
vulnerability (weakness).
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replace the random number generators by quantum random number generators [29] and thus go for a hybrid
(classical-quantum) technology. Subsequently, they should look at the possibilities of implementing semi-quantum
[30, 31] protocols which would require end users (customers) to have quantum resources which are costly. A final
goal should be to implement unconditionally secure and device independent quantum schemes [32,33].
5 Conclusions
Most of the Indian banks are found to support insecure SSL ciphers. Some of the previous studies were restricted
to the banks of specific region or country (e.g., investigations performed in Refs [4,10,11,15–17,19] were restricted
to the banks of India, Hongkong and Malyasia, respectively), whereas others were not restricted. Present study is
also focused on Indian banks, but the methodology adopted and the conclusions obtained are valid in general. To
emphasis on this point we analyze the security of 11 non-Indian banks, which are selected from different continents.
In what follows, we briefly note the outcome of such an investigation in Table 5.
S.
No
Name of
the bank
(Country)
Website Server (Grade) Issues that reduced the grade
1 Bank of
America
(USA)
https://secure.bank
ofamerica.com/
171.161.203.200 (A-) This server does not support Forward
Secrecy with the reference browsers.
Grade will be capped to B from March
2018. This server’s certificate will be
distrusted by Google and Mozilla from
September 2018. HTTP Strict
Transport Security (HSTS) with long
duration deployed on this server.
2 jpmorgan
chase
(USA)
www.chase.com 159.53.224.21 (A-) This server does not support Forward
Secrecy with the reference browsers.
Grade will be capped to B from March
2018. HTTP Strict Transport Security
(HSTS) with long duration deployed
on this server.
3 Bank of
Brazil
(Brazil)
www.bb
americas.com
52.84.237.182 (A)
52.84.237.72 (A)
52.84.237.12 (A)
52.84.237.180 (A)
52.84.237.121 (A)
52.84.237.77 (A)
52.84.237.80 (A)
52.84.237.203 (A)
4 Steward
Bank (Zim-
babwe)
onlinebanking.
stewardbank.co.zw
41.216.125.233 (B) This server supports weak
Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange
parameters. Grade capped to B. This
site works only in browsers with SNI
support.
5 Avtovaz
bank
(Russia)
server29.cey-
ebanking.com
12.191.20.25 (C) The server supports only older
protocols, but not the current best
TLS 1.2. Grade capped to C. This
server does not support Forward
Secrecy with the reference browsers.
Grade will be capped to B from March
2018. This server does not support
Authenticated encryption (AEAD)
cipher suites. Grade will be capped to
B from March 2018.
10
6 Pingan
Bank
(China)
bank.pingan.com 115.231.227.16 (A)
27.148.164.23(A)
7 Police
Bank Ltd
(Australia)
ebanking.police
bank.com.au
103.11.142.65 (A) This server’s certificate will be
distrusted by Google and Mozilla from
September 2018
8 Bank of
Melbourne
(Australia)
ibanking.bankof
melbourne.com.au
203.23.44.204 (A) This server does not support
Authenticated encryption (AEAD)
cipher suites. Grade will be capped to
B from March 2018.
9 Bank
Kerjasama
Rakyat
Malaysia
Berhad
(Malaysia)
www2.irakyat
.com.my
1.9.61.247 (B) This server is vulnerable to the Return
of Bleichenbacher’s Oracle Threat
(ROBOT) vulnerability. Grade will be
set to F from March 2018. This server
supports weak Diffie-Hellman (DH)
key exchange parameters. Grade
capped to B. This server uses SSL 3,
which is obsolete and insecure. Grade
capped to B. This server accepts RC4
cipher, but only with older protocols.
Grade capped to B. This server does
not support Forward Secrecy with the
reference browsers. Grade will be
capped to B from March 2018
10 National
Bank of
Pakistan
(Pakistan)
https://nbp.com.
pk/login/
167.114.191.212 (A+) This server’s certificate will be
distrusted by Google and Mozilla from
September 2018. HTTP Strict
Transport Security (HSTS) with long
duration deployed on this server.
11 Agrani
Bank
Limited
(Bangladesh)
www.agranibank.org 180.92.224.101 (B) This server supports weak
Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange
parameters. Grade capped to B. This
server does not support Forward
Secrecy with the reference browsers.
Grade will be capped to B from March
2018. This server’s certificate chain is
incomplete. Grade capped to B. This
server’s certificate will be distrusted
by Google and Mozilla from
September 2018.
Table 5: Security analysis of some non-Indian banks.
This study is unique, as it’s the first one of its kind in the context of Indian banks. However, the analysis
performed is not deep enough. Consequently, it opens up the possibility of a deeper analysis in future (which will
be reported elsewhere). As the adopted method is valid in general, it’s possible to use this simple approach to
analyze the security of banks and other e-commerce sites of other countries, too. Finally, we conclude the article
with an optimistic view and a hope that this article will be able to draw the attention of the concerned authorities,
and necessary steps will be taken by them to perform regular checking of vulnerability of the encryption techniques
adopted by then (as recommended by RBI) and to take corrective measures wherever required. This would help
banks to provide higher security and thus to improve the confidence level of the end-users (acceptability of the
end-users), which the banks desire to improve. Further, we hope that the suggestions made from the perspectives
of a cryptographer will be used by the banks in near future and that would help them to circumvent many attacks
in the future.
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Appendix A
S.
No
Bank
Name
Website Connection Encrypted Verified by
(Certifica-
tion
Authority)
1 Allahabad
Bank
www.allahabadbank.in TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_
SHA, 256 bit keys, TLS 1.0
Symantec
Corporation
2 Andhra
Bank
www.onlineandhra
bank.net.in
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_
SHA384, 256 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Entrust, Inc.
3 State Bank
of India
retail.onlinesbi.com TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_
SHA384, 256 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Symantec
Corporation
4 Axis Bank
Limited
retail.axisbank.co.in TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_
SHA384, 256 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Symantec
Corporation
5 HDFC Bank
Limited.
netbanking.
hdfcbank.com
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_
SHA384, 256 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Symantec
Corporation
6 Jammu and
Kashmir
Bank
Limited
starconnectcbs.
bankofindia.com
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_
SHA384, 256 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Symantec
Corporation
7 Bandhan
Bank
Limited
bandhanbankonline.com TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_
SHA384, 256 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Entrust, Inc.
8 Vijaya Bank www.vijayabank
online.in
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_
SHA, 256 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Entrust, Inc.
9 The Catholic
Syrian Bank
Ltd
www.csbnet.co.in TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_
SHA, 256 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Symantec
Corporation
10 Tamilnad
Mercantile
Bank
Limited
www.tmbnet.in TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_
SHA, 256 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Symantec
Corporation
11 Canara
Bank
netbanking.canara
bank.in
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA,
256 bit keys, TLS 1.2
GlobalSign
nv-sa
12 Corporation
Bank
www.corpretail.com TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA,
256 bit keys, TLS 1.2
GlobalSign
nv-sa
13 Indian
Overseas
Bank
www.iobnet.co.in TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA,
256 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Symantec
Corporation
14 Oriental
Bank of
Commerce
www.obconline.co.in TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA,
256 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Symantec
Corporation
15 IDBI Bank
Ltd
inet.idbibank.co.in TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA,
256 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Entrust, Inc.
16 United Bank
of India
ebank.unitedbank
ofindia.com
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA,
256 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Symantec
Corporation
17 Dhanlaxmi
Bank
Limited
netbank.dhanbank.in TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA,
256 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Entrust, Inc.
18 ICICI Bank
Limited
infinity.icicibank.com TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA,
256 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Entrust, Inc.
19 IndusInd
Bank Ltd
indusnet.indusind.com TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA,
256 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Entrust, Inc.
20 RBL Bank
Limited
online.rblbank.com TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA,
256 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Entrust, Inc.
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21 Yes Bank
Limited
netbanking.yes
bank.co.in
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA,
256 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Symantec
Corporation
22 PUNJAB
AND SIND
BANK
www.psbonline.co.in TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_ SHA,
112 bit keys, TLS 1.2
GlobalSign
nv-sa
23 Syndicate
Bank
www.syndonline.in TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_ SHA,
112 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Symantec
Corporation
24 IDFC Bank
Limited
my.idfcbank.com TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_ SHA,
112 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Entrust, Inc.
25 Kotak
Mahindra
Bank Ltd
www.kotak.com TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_ SHA,
112 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Entrust, Inc.
26 The Karur
Vysya Bank
Ltd
www.kvbnet.co.in TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_ SHA,
112 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Symantec
Corporation
27 The South
Indian Bank
Ltd
sibernet.southindian
bank.com
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_ SHA,
112 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Entrust, Inc
28 Bank of
Baroda
www.bobibanking.com TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_ SHA,
128 bit keys, TLS 1.0
Symantec
Corporation
29 Punjab
National
Bank
netbanking.netpnb.com TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_ SHA,
128 bit keys, TLS 1.0
Symantec
Corporation
30 Indian Bank www.indianbank.net.in TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_ SHA,
128 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Symantec
Corporation
31 UCO Bank www.ucoebanking.com TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_ SHA,
128 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Symantec
Corporation
32 The Federal
Bank
Limited
www.fednetbank.com TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_ SHA,
128 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Symantec
Corporation
33 Karnataka
Bank
Limited
moneyclick.karnataka
bank.co.in
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_ SHA,
128 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Symantec
Corporation
34 LAKSHMI
VILAS
BANK
LIMITED
www.lvbankonline.in TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_ SHA,
128 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Symantec
Corporation
35 DCB BANK pib.dcbbank.com TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_S HA,
128 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Symantec
Corporation
36 Bank of
India
starconnectcbs.bank
ofindia.com
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_
SHA, 256 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Entrust, Inc.
37 Central
Bank of
India
www.centralbank.net.in TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_
SHA, 128 bit keys, TLS 1.2
Symantec
Corporation
38 Dena Bank www.denaiconnect.co.in TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_ SHA,
112 bit keys, TLS 1.0
Symantec
Corporation
Table A.I: String that identifies the security measures taken by
a bank for encryption and authentication is listed along with the
name of CA who has issued the security certificate.
S.
No
Weakness Public Bank Private
Bank
Total
1 vulnerable to the OpenSSL
Padding Oracle vulnerability
0 1 1
15
2 MITM attack 2 1 3
3 Forward secrecy with the
reference browsers is not
suported
12 14 26
4 supports anonymous (insecure)
suites
1 0 1
5 supports insecure cipher suites 1 0 1
6 supports weak DH key exchange 2 2 4
7 FREAK attack 1 0 1
8 intermediate ceritificate with
insecure signature
1 1 2
9 TLS 1.2 is not supported 3 0 3
10 Accepts/uses RC4 7 8 15
11 Intolerant to newer protocol 1 0 1
12 POODEL TLS attack 3 1 4
13 Supports SSL3 4 3 7
14 uses 64-bit block cipher (3DES
/ DES / RC2 / IDEA) with
modern protocols
2 4 6
15 No support for secure
renegotiation.
2 3 5
Table A.II: Various vulnerable ciphers that are used by the bank
with low grades.
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